The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework: Will It Survive Without the US?

Right, gather around! It seems we’ve got ourselves a classic case of political musical chairs; with Donald Trump back in the picture, it looks like the US is about to yank itself out of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) faster than you can say “trade deal.” It’s almost like watching someone flop around in a kiddie pool, isn’t it? But here’s the kicker — despite the impending American exit, the remaining players in this trade game aren’t throwing in the towel just yet.

Trump’s Trade Tango

Let’s rewind to 2017, shall we? Trump kicked off his presidency by declaring, “Thanks, but no thanks” to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which back then was the belle of the economic ball. Fast forward to now, and he’s ready to do the same with IPEF. His re-election campaign is sounding a lot like a broken record, repeating the “America First” tune while regional partners in Southeast Asia are left wondering if they should join in the chorus or start a different song altogether.

The IPEF was meant to be more about values than cold hard cash — some sort of “worker-centric” trade escapade that sought to uplift US workers while keeping environmental and anti-corruption issues at the forefront. But here’s the thing: Southeast Asian countries signed up for it hoping it would give them a bit more leverage against China, who’s been playing the economic chess game like a grandmaster.

Balancing Acts and Bold Moves

Now, let’s be honest for a moment — if you’re looking for golden markets and solid commitments from the US, signing onto IPEF might have felt a bit like going to an all-you-can-eat buffet and walking away with a single lettuce leaf. While the US was busy focusing on its own “worker-friendly” policies, these Southeast Asian countries were like, “How about a slice of market access? Just a wee bit?” But, alas, the US had other plans, opting instead for a framework that felt more like an olive branch than a meal.

Although IPEF will not achieve the important goal of drawing the US deeper into the region to counterbalance China, there is sufficient value in it to justify finishing the job.

Will Southeast Asia Make the Most of IPEF?

Even if the US exits stage left, the IPEF still holds some cards worth playing for the Southeast Asian members. While their goal of countering Chinese influence might not pan out to the extent they hoped, the focus on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and digital trade is like finding a forgotten ten-dollar bill in that tiny pocket of your jacket — surprising, and certainly nice to have! A strong digital economy could be the lifeboat these countries need.

Here’s where it gets cheeky. IPEF might not be what the US had envisioned (in fact, it’s a bit of a misfit toy), but with some savvy reworking, it could still prove meaningful for the ASEAN nations. Why not pave the way for Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar to join? They might just provide the extra spice needed to jazz things up!

A New Hope for IPEF?

In a nutshell — or should I say noodle bowl — the IPEF saga isn’t over yet. The suggestion on the table is to give it a makeover. Take a leaf out of the CPTPP handbook: Maybe suspend some of those pesky provisions and make the agreement reflect more regional desires rather than just a center stage for US interests. Throw China into the mix, and suddenly, the IPEF might resemble the lively karaoke scene you stumbled into after a few too many drinks: unexpected, chaotic, but potentially a whole lot of fun!

Final Thoughts

So, where do we stand? The IPEF could be a beacon of opportunity for the remaining Southeast Asian nations, even if its star player (the US) is sinking into the dark depths of trade policy oblivion. It’s crucial to adapt, reshape, and embrace new realities if these countries want to thrive in the unpredictable waters of global trade.

Grab your paddles, folks; we’re just getting started!

The United States is poised to withdraw from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a significant move anticipated under the leadership of President-elect Donald Trump, who is expected to take office in January 2024. Trump’s commitment to disengage from Joe Biden’s hallmark trade agreement is grounded in historical precedent; during his initial day in office back in 2017, he abandoned the Obama administration’s pivotal trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), setting a clear tone for his trade policy.

In the aftermath of Trump’s previous withdrawal from the TPP, a coalition of remaining member countries, known as the “TPP 11,” found new life. They successfully recalibrated their approach, negotiating revisions and ultimately implementing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), a successor to the TPP. The Southeast Asian nations still engaged in IPEF—Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam—could apply a similar strategy should the US officially exit the IPEF.

It is vital to recognize that the IPEF has primarily been a US-led initiative, one that has drawn tepid enthusiasm from its partners. This agreement reflects the priorities of the Biden administration more than the collective aspirations of the region. Rather than adhering to traditional trade frameworks that focus on reducing tariffs and promoting freer trade, IPEF embodies Biden’s vision of a worker-centric trade policy aimed at fostering the US middle class while also pursuing broader goals including environmental sustainability, anti-corruption measures, and the development of resilient supply chains among allied nations.

Despite regional partners expressing a strong desire for robust market access commitments from the US, these were notably absent from IPEF due to the Biden administration’s apprehensions about intensifying competition for US workers. IPEF features four distinct pillars—trade, clean economy, fair economy, and supply chains—crafted as a collaborative framework rather than a legally binding agreement intent on lowering barriers.

The reasons for the involvement of seven Southeast Asian nations in IPEF, despite the absence of key commitments, lie in geopolitical strategies as well as economic imperatives. Many nations in the region find their interests best served by striking a balance between the influence of China and the USA, particularly as Chinese dominance has surged in recent years. China has emerged as a principal trading partner for numerous Southeast Asian countries, establishing extensive supply chains and promoting infrastructural development through its Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, China has taken the lead in forming trade agreements, notably culminating in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2020.

However, the progression of IPEF has faced delays. While advancements in the clean and fair economy pillars have reached substantial closure, the cornerstone trade pillar remains unsettled. Concerns from Congressional Democrats regarding insufficient labor provisions stalled its anticipated conclusion at the APEC meeting in San Francisco in October 2024. Since that setback, the initiative has remained in a state of uncertainty, pending the outcome of the US elections. Trump’s resurgence in power has brought US engagement with IPEF to an abrupt halt.

Despite the potential withdrawal of the US from IPEF, its relevance persists for the Southeast Asian nations. While the initial aim of embedding the US deeper into the region to counterbalance China may not materialize, the IPEF still holds value worth pursuing. Dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the region stands to benefit significantly from IPEF’s provisions designed to enhance digital trade capabilities and reinforce supply chain resilience. These provisions aim to facilitate access to digital markets for SMEs, develop secure digital infrastructures, and foster cooperation on business growth.

The framework also addresses the necessity of adapting labor and environmental policies to align with regional needs, suggesting that a restructured IPEF could yield benefits for all parties involved. This new approach could engage in meaningful dialogue on key topics like data flows and localization requirements that better reflect the interests of Southeast Asian participants.

A revised, “post-US” IPEF might serve as a modest yet promising step forward, offering incremental advantages to member nations while embracing contemporary trade dynamics. With the vision of becoming a “living” agreement, it allows room for growth and adaptation over time, which could prove invaluable in a rapidly changing global landscape.

Reflecting on the TPP and CPTPP, it could be beneficial to suspend certain US-centric provisions from IPEF, potentially welcoming additional ASEAN members like Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar to join the fold. The prospect of including China in such discussions could amplify the advantages for all supply chain participants throughout the region, underscoring the importance of collaborative engagement.

Ultimately, the trajectory of IPEF and its impact remains uncertain and will unfold over time. Nonetheless, for Southeast Asia, which has witnessed remarkable growth driven primarily by SMEs capitalizing on global trade through resilient supply chains, this experiment in trade cooperation holds great potential worth pursuing.

2024/351

What are the implications for Southeast Asian economies if the U.S.‌ withdraws from the Indo-Pacific Economic⁤ Framework?

**Interview:⁢ The Future of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Without U.S. Participation**

**Host:** Welcome, everyone! Today⁣ we ⁣have with us Dr. Maria ⁢Chen,⁣ an esteemed geopolitical analyst specializing in‌ trade relations in⁢ the Indo-Pacific ‌region. Maria,⁤ thank you for joining us.

**Dr. Chen:** Thank you for having me! ⁤I’m excited to⁣ discuss this pivotal topic.

**Host:**⁣ So, we’ve seen a potential ‌U.S. withdrawal from⁣ the⁢ Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, or​ IPEF, under the anticipated leadership of Donald Trump. How significant do you think this move would ​be‍ for the ⁤Southeast Asian nations involved in IPEF?

**Dr. Chen:** Well, the withdrawal would indeed⁣ be significant. The U.S. has played a central‍ role in shaping IPEF, which aimed to provide a platform for collaboration on a variety of issues, including⁢ trade, labor, ⁤and environmental standards. However, the Southeast⁤ Asian nations involved—like Vietnam and Indonesia—have been keen to‌ balance​ their relations with both the U.S. and China. They‌ might see this as an opportunity to recalibrate their economic strategies.

**Host:** Speaking of⁤ China, many Southeast Asian countries ⁢were looking to ⁢IPEF as a way to counterbalance Chinese influence. If the U.S. pulls out, do ⁤you think those nations can still leverage ⁣IPEF effectively?

**Dr. Chen:** Absolutely. While the primary goal of​ counterbalancing China might not ​be fully realized, IPEF still provides significant benefits for these ⁢countries. The focus⁤ on​ digital trade and support ⁣for ‌small and medium-sized ⁣enterprises (SMEs)‌ can drive ​economic growth. This is vital, considering that most of‍ the region’s economy ⁣is⁣ driven by SMEs. They can continue to pursue⁢ regional goals ​and deepen partnerships with each other.

**Host:** ⁣In ⁢light of Trump’s “America First” agenda, how do you view the Southeast Asian countries’ expectations from the IPEF?

**Dr. Chen:** That’s an excellent point. Many Southeast Asian nations joined‌ IPEF with the expectation of gaining more‍ market access and economic benefits. Unfortunately,⁣ the current U.S.‌ framework prioritizes​ worker-centric policies over broader trade commitments. This has led to some disillusionment, but it ⁤doesn’t mean the Southeast ⁢Asians will‌ give up. They can adapt the‌ initiative to⁣ suit their needs, similar to how the remaining TPP members created the CPTPP after the U.S. withdrawal ⁢from that agreement.

**Host:**⁣ So, what could a post-U.S. IPEF look like for ASEAN nations?

**Dr. Chen:** There’s ⁣definitely potential for IPEF to evolve. If ​the ⁣U.S.⁢ officially‌ withdraws, ‌ASEAN could work to ​revise the framework to better reflect regional‌ interests. They might involve more countries, like Laos and Cambodia, which would enrich the dialogues and‌ partnerships. Ultimately, focusing on​ digital economy growth and cooperation among ​SMEs could⁤ turn⁣ IPEF into a ‍robust platform that still engages with global trade dynamics, even without⁣ the U.S.

**Host:** ‌Final thoughts? Can IPEF succeed without its star player?

**Dr. Chen:** I think it can, but it will require a significant ⁣shift in approach. Southeast Asian nations must be ⁢willing to ⁣redefine their ​goals and foster closer‍ collaboration. They should ‍leverage the IPEF’s structure to promote their collective interests and assert more regional autonomy amid the fluctuating‍ influence of superpowers like China and the ​U.S.

**Host:** Thank you, Dr. Chen! It ⁤sounds like despite the challenges, there is still hope​ for IPEF. We appreciate​ your insights!

**Dr. Chen:** Thank⁣ you for having me!‌ It’s​ been a pleasure ​discussing this intriguing development.