The Trump Factor and European Anxiety

The elephant in the room, of course, is donald Trump. His past rhetoric questioning NATO’s value and suggesting allies should develop their own nuclear weapons has sent shockwaves through Europe. during his first term, Trump openly mused about countries building their own nuclear weapons if they weren’t willing to pay the United States more for security.

As one Trump administration official put it, regarding allied proliferation, it might potentially be a policy preference. For some Trump administration defense officials, allied proliferation is a policy preference. It is not surprising, in these circumstances, that Tusk and others would consider their options. But building a bomb takes time. Will the shadow of Trump stretch out to the decade or so that it might take Poland to fashion an independent deterrent?

While many viewed this as a negotiating tactic designed to increase defense spending among NATO members, the message was received loud and clear: America’s commitment isn’t unconditional. This perceived shift has forced European leaders to confront uncomfortable questions about their own security.

Macron’s Gambit: A European Nuclear Dimension?

In February 2020,French President Emmanuel Macron subtly introduced the idea of a “European dimension” to France’s vital interests, leaving the rest to the listener’s imagination. Macron reignited the debate in January, only to face immediate pushback.

When he said it again in January, Macron was misquoted as having said the quiet part out loud. His opponents on the left and right pounced on him.

However, Friedrich Merz, leader of Germany’s Christian Democratic Union, suggested Germany should discuss “nuclear sharing, or at least nuclear security from the U.K. and France, could also apply to us.”

Soon after, leaders from the Baltic states expressed interest in Macron’s suggestion. That NATO nations are discussing whether and how France might extend deterrence is a sign of how sharply the European security surroundings has changed.

France’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Different Approach

France,which tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960,has always remained apart from these activities. France does not participate in NATO’s nuclear planning group or its high-level group.

Unlike the U.S., which forward-deploys tactical nuclear weapons in several NATO countries, France maintains an independent nuclear deterrent, focusing on strategic weapons designed to protect its “vital interests.” This concept, however, is deliberately ambiguous.

One of the core issues is credibility. As the article points out, “The challenge of extending a nuclear ‘umbrella’ is making sure that the threat to respond to an armed attack on *them* with *our* weapons is credible in scenarios where nuclear weapons come into play.” This requires a clear commitment,robust dialog,and a shared understanding of red lines.

Poland’s Nuclear Ambitions: A Factory-Sized Undertaking

The prospect of Poland developing its own nuclear arsenal is a complex and daunting one. It’s one thing to float the idea, as Polish leaders have done; it’s another to actually build the necessary infrastructure.

It’s easy to talk about building a nuclear arsenal, but it’s rather another thing to do it. One of the things that is common knowledge in the nuclear field, but actually kind of surprising to normal people, is that designing a compact weapon is actually pretty easy.

Thermonuclear weapons designs haven’t changed a lot in the past 50 years. What is difficult, conversely, is building the facilities to produce the nuclear material—plutonium or highly enriched uranium—that is the heart of a nuclear explosive.

as the article details, Poland would face two primary paths:

• Uranium Enrichment: Building a facility to convert uranium into gas and then using centrifuges to enrich it to weapons-grade levels. This is the path Iran has pursued.
• Plutonium Production: Building a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium and then constructing a chemical reprocessing facility to extract it from spent fuel.

Both options are incredibly expensive, time-consuming (measured in years, if not decades), and require significant technical expertise. As Niels Bohr famously remarked,”You see,I told you it couldn’t be done without turning the whole country into a factory.”

Poland’s Westinghouse Deal

In October 2022, Poland announced that it had selected Westinghouse to build three civilian nuclear power reactors for about $20 billion each.Construction is expected to start in 2026 and will take about seven years. These reactors will make plutonium, but they will be under international safeguards, and their design makes it much more difficult to use the plutonium in a weapon. (The same goes for Poland’s MARIA research reactor.)

still, the timeline gives some idea of how long it would take Poland to build the facilities necessary. Poland would also have to think about how to deliver such a weapon, which means making decisions about missiles or fighter aircraft. Nuclear weapons programs are measured in years, sometimes decades, with expenses running in the many tens of billions of dollars.

The Proliferation Puzzle: Why So Few Have the Bomb

despite interest from numerous nations, only a handful have actually developed nuclear weapons.Producing nuclear material is expensive, difficult, and takes a long time.

That’s because producing nuclear material is expensive, difficult, and takes a long time. Obviously, Poland could go faster with help.But historically, long timelines have afforded the United States both leverage over potential proliferators, who also needed help to get their program going, and time to make them a better offer—or at least an offer that they can’t refuse.

For allies, time allows the United States to offer immediate and attractive options, such as extended nuclear deterrence, in place of an uncertain and very prospective pursuit of independent nuclear deterrent. In Europe and Asia, such as, U.S.offers of nuclear-sharing and forward deployment helped dissuade nuclear-capable allies such as Germany and Japan from acquiring their own weapons. The gift of time also means that resolute leaders might not be around long enough to follow through, or that the circumstances that make nuclear weapons appealing might change.

As my colleague at the Middlebury Institute, Philipp Bleek, has argued, many countries—including U.S. allies—have *explored* a nuclear weapons option in one fashion or another. Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, egypt, (West) Germany, indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Libya, Norway, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, and Taiwan have all at least considered the possibility of a nuclear-armed future.

very few countries that have explored have followed through, and currently, only nine countries have gone all the way and acquired them.Iran is somewhere in between, although that story is not yet over. Tehran would make 10.

The reasons for this are multifaceted: cost, technical challenges, international pressure, and, perhaps most importantly, the availability of alternative security guarantees, primarily from the United States.

What are the possible Pathways?

But France and the U.K. do not extend nuclear deterrence in the same way the United States does. the challenge of extending a nuclear “umbrella” is making sure that the threat to respond to an armed attack on *them* with *our* weapons is credible in scenarios where nuclear weapons come into play.

several scenarios are possible regarding the extending of nuclear deterence.

• France might just give Poland a security guarantee.
• France could invite Polish fighters to practice escorting French nuclear-armed strike aircraft en route to Moscow, something that Poland already does with the United States (through the Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics program, or SNOWCAT).
• France could station some of those fighters in Poland.
• France could devise arrangements for nuclear sharing.

Implications for the U.S.

This shifting landscape in Europe has significant implications for the united States. A more independent European defense posture could,in theory,free up U.S. resources to focus on challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Though, it also introduces new risks, including the potential for miscalculation and a weakening of NATO unity.

The United States has a general obligation to Poland and other NATO members to respond to an armed attack on any member. The United States also has 3,748 nuclear weapons at last count, in September 2023. At some level, France and the United Kingdom are no different. They have the same general obligation—and, of course, they also possess (fewer) nuclear weapons.

The Road Ahead

Whether Europe will be willing to follow France’s lead is something of a gamble. Tusk did not rule out an independent Polish nuclear deterrent in the future and, if things continue the way they have been, many more countries may be weighing their options.

The future of European nuclear deterrence remains uncertain. Much will depend on the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy, the evolution of the security environment in Eastern Europe, and the political will of European leaders to forge a more independent defense identity. The conversation has started. Now, the hard work of defining what a “European nuclear dimension” actually means begins.

Whether that future comes to pass will depend tremendously on the ability of the United States—and now France—to address polish security concerns in this new, more risky environment.