Four years after the military junta, officially known as the State Administration Council (SAC), seized power in Myanmar, the nation remains embroiled in a relentless cycle of violence, political instability, and economic decline. Though, beneath the surface, a sophisticated and multifaceted resistance movement is gaining traction, united by the shared aspiration of establishing a federal democratic union with an elected civilian government and equitable political representation for all ethnic communities.

As numerous regions along Myanmar’s diverse ethnic borderlands transition from junta control to various armed resistance groups, neighboring nations like India and China are compelled to reassess their strategies and interactions with all parties involved. Despite the growing challenge posed by resistance groups and the potential expansion of china’s influence, India has adopted a cautious approach. It has maintained public relations with the junta while engaging cautiously and covertly with specific ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Though,this approach may prove inadequate as the junta weakens. To protect its interests, India must adapt to Myanmar’s evolving political landscape and broaden its engagement with the various groups involved in the conflict.

Myanmar’s Evolving Political Geography

Despite the widespread resistance ignited by the Spring Revolution following the coup, the junta has largely maintained control over the heartland, predominantly inhabited by the Bamar people, who constitute approximately 70% of the population.The dry Zone in central Myanmar has historically served as the military’s vital political, cultural, and territorial stronghold. While newly formed armed resistance groups, such as the Local Defence Forces (LDF) and the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), have attracted Bamar fighters across the heartland since the coup, the moast intense warfare has been largely confined to the ethnic minority uplands surrounding the Bamar heartland. Even Operation 1027, the coordinated anti-regime offensive that swept through the north in October 2023, did not penetrate the core of the heartland.

However,this protective barrier around the Bamar heartland may be crumbling. Certain EAOs and their PDF allies are now opening new frontlines closer to the core regions. The Arakan Army (AA),an ethnic Rakhine EAO,has made significant territorial gains in Rakhine state and is now threatening to expand its operations into the Bamar heartland. This shift presents a significant challenge to the junta and could alter the dynamics of the conflict.

India’s Balancing Act

Amid these changes, India finds itself in a precarious position. on one hand, it has legitimate security concerns related to the porous border it shares with Myanmar, notably regarding the potential for cross-border militancy and drug trafficking. Maintaining a working relationship with the junta allows India to cooperate on these issues.

China’s growing influence

China’s growing influence in Myanmar is a major concern for India. Beijing has long cultivated close ties with the Myanmar military and has invested heavily in infrastructure projects in the country, including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).India views the CMEC as a potential strategic threat, as it could give China greater access to the Indian Ocean.

The Shifting Sands of Engagement

Recent events underscore India’s complex and evolving approach to Myanmar. SAC chief, Min Aung Hlaing, visited Beijing, marking his first trip there since the coup. Shortly after, India seemed to reinforce its ties with the junta. A seminar in New Delhi, initially intended for EAOs and the National Unity Government (NUG), was instead attended by a junta-led delegation.India’s ambassador in Yangon, Abhay Thakur, has also held several meetings with senior SAC officials, with the Indian military welcoming SAC contingents for training.

These actions appear to be a signal to Beijing that India is still a key player in Myanmar. In January, the Indian Embassy in Myanmar released a press statement that referred to the Kaladan project as a corridor, seemingly to compete with the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).

The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (embedded youtube video)

Can India Mediate?

India’s reluctance to fully disengage from the junta stems from several factors. New Delhi may not be convinced that the resistance can decisively defeat the junta, despite recent gains. India also lacks a history of formal diplomatic engagement with non-state armed groups until they control the federal administration. The absence of a central figure like aung San Suu Kyi and the presence of multiple influential groups make it arduous for New Delhi to determine who to engage with in the resistance. Additionally, concerns exist within the Indian establishment that some EAOs in Myanmar harbor separatist ambitions, mirroring anxieties about ethnic armed movements in Northeast India.The proximity of some eaos to the porous northeastern border further exacerbates these concerns.

As the largest federal democracy in the region, India has the normative standing to support a genuine federal democracy in Myanmar […] To these ends, India must show commitment toward diversifying its relationships with the prime movers of the Spring Revolution.

Though, the situation is rapidly changing. Despite ceasefires with powerful EAOs, the junta struggles to regain lost territory and relies on airstrikes, drones, and violent militias, inflicting indiscriminate violence on civilians. This behavior makes the junta an unreliable partner for securing India’s long-term interests in Myanmar, meaning New Delhi must consider a new approach.

As a democracy, India has the opportunity to provide an option to China’s coercive style of conflict mediation in Myanmar. To achieve this, India must diversify its relationships with the key players in the Spring Revolution. This could involve engaging in behind-the-scenes talks and targeted conflict mediation that protects its border interests while benefiting local communities. While such moves carry risks, such as the junta’s sharp response to the Mizoram chief minister brokering a peace deal between warring factions in Chin state, discreetly aiding political cohesion among non-SAC forces along the border could favor Indian interests in the short and medium term. India should also leverage its relationships with these groups to provide humanitarian aid to conflict-affected border communities.

India regularly claims to stand with the people of Myanmar. Now, it needs to prove it.

The U.S.Perspective

For U.S. readers, the situation in Myanmar highlights the challenges of balancing geopolitical interests with democratic values. The U.S. has condemned the coup and imposed sanctions on the junta,but it also recognizes the importance of maintaining stability in the region and preventing further Chinese expansion. India’s approach to Myanmar, therefore, has implications for U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific.

Like the US,other Western countries face similar dilemmas. Is it possible to encourage a transition to democracy in Myanmar while minimizing regional instability and avoiding a deeper slide into China’s orbit?

Additional Insights and Analysis

One area for further investigation is the role of social media in the Myanmar conflict. Social media platforms have been used by both the junta and the resistance to spread propaganda and mobilize support. understanding how these platforms are being used and how they can be countered is crucial for promoting a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Addressing Counterarguments

Some may argue that India’s engagement with the junta is necessary to maintain stability and prevent further Chinese influence. However, this argument overlooks the fact that the junta’s actions are fueling the conflict and undermining any prospects for a peaceful resolution. By continuing to support the junta, India risks alienating the people of Myanmar and damaging its own reputation as a democratic leader in the region.